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BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE

Outline of Basic Provisions
of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

H. • • not to an arms race but to a peace
race- to advance together step by step,
stage by stage, until general and complete
disarmament has been achieved."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY
September 25, 1961

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY PUBLICATION 4
General Series 3
Released May 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. - Price 30 cents

Statement by President Kennedy
Press Conference, April 18, 1962
The United States has today tabled at Geneva an outline
of every basic provision of a treaty on general and complete
disarmament in a peaceful world. It provides a blueprint of
our position on general and complete disarmament as well as
elaboration of the nature, sequence, and timing of specific
disarmament measures.
This outline of a treaty represents the most comprehensive
and specific series of proposals the United States or any other
country has ever made on disarmament. In addition to
stating the objectives and principles which should govern
agreements for disarmament, the document calls for the
grouping of individual measures in three balanced and safeguarded stages. We are hopeful through the give-and-take of
the conference table this plan will have a constructive influence
upon the negotiations now in progress.
I want to stress that with this plan the United States is
making a major effort to achieve a breakthrough on disarmament negotiations. We believe that the nations represented at
Geneva have a heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for
a genuinely secure and peaceful world starting through a
reduction in arms.

Foreword
An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free
from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the
rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. Today, in a world -riven
by dangerous tensions and mistrust, the attainment of this goal
necessit,a tes continuing and patient efforts to achieve the progressive reduction of national warmaking capabilities in such a
manner as to increase the security of all nations. Thus, responsible arms control and disarmament proposals cannot
be directed toward the attainment of unilateral political or
military advantage. They must be fully responsive to the
legitimate security interests of all nations.
On the basis of these considerations, President Kennedy on
September 25, 1961, presented to the General Assembly of the
United Nations the "United States Program for General and
Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." To provide a
more precise statement of the United States approach to disarmament and the manner in which that approach should be
implemented, the United States on April 18, 1962, presented
to the conference of the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament,
meeting in Geneva, an "Outline of Basic rrovisions of a Treaty
on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World."
Although not a draft treaty, the "Outline" elaborates and extends the proposals of September 25 and provides in specific
terms a substantial basis for the negotiation of arms control
and disarmament treaty obligations.
The principal provisions of the United States Outline are described in the summary that follows. The complete text of
the Outline begins on page 5.

Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World
SUMMARY
Principles and Process of Disarmament
Disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced
manner so that at no stage could any state or group of states obtain
military advantage. Compliance with obligations would be effectively verified. As national armaments were reduced, the United
Nations would be progressively strengthened.
Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages-the first to
be carried out in 3 years; the second, also in 3 years; and the third,
as promptly as possible within an agreed period of time. Stage I
would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and
other agreed states. All militarily: significant states would participate in Stage II; and all states possessing armaments and armed
forces, in Stage III.
Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take
place upon a determination that all undertakings in the preceding
stage had been carried out and that all preparations for the next
stage had been made.

Disarmament Measures
A. ARMAMENTS.
During Stage I, inventories of major categories
of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments would
be reduced by 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be reduced
with associated missiles. Half of the remaining inventories would be
eliminated during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in
Stage III. Upon the completion of Stage III, states would have at
their disposal only agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for forces
required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security
of citizens.
Production of armaments during Stfl,ge I would be)imited t.o agreed
allowances and would be compensated for by the destruction of additiqnal armaments to the end that reductions would not be impaired.
In Stage II, production of armanlents would be halted except for
parts for maintenance of retained armaments. Any further produc-
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tion of national armaments would be ended in Stage III except for production of agreed types of nonnuclear armnments for internal forces.
Military research, development, and testing would be subject t.o
increasing limitations .during the disarmament process. During Stage
III, appropriate action would be taken to insure that new scientific
discoveries and technological inventions of military significance were
not used for military purposes.
B. ARMED FORCES.
Force levels of the United States and Soviet
Union would be reduced to 2.1 million at the end of Stage I. Half
of the remaining forces of these two states would be disbanded during
Stage II, and final reductions wou1d be made in Stage III. Other
states would also progressively reduce their force levels. By the end
of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only those agreed
forces and related organizational arrangements required to maintain
internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Production of fissionable materials for use
in nuclear weapons wou1d be halted in Stage I, and limitations would
be imposed on the production of fissionable materials for other purposes. The availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear
weapo~s would be reduced during Stage I and subsequent stages by
safeguarded transfers to nonnuclear weapons purposes.
If nuclear weapons tests had not already been halted under effective
international control, arrangements to this end would be undertaken
in Stage I. States which had manufactured nuclear weapons would
agree in Stage I not to transfer control over nuclear weapons to states
which had not manufactured them or to assist such states in their
manufacture. States which had not manufactured nuclear weapons
would refrain from seeking them. Transfers of fissionable materials
between states would be limited to peaceful purposes and would be
safeguarded.
Beginning in Stage II, nonnuclear components and assemblies of
nuclear weapons would be destroyed and limitations would be imposed on further production or refabrication of nuclear weapons. At
the end of Stage II, remaining nuclear weapons would be registered
internationally to assist in verifying the fact that by the end of Stage
III states would not have such weapons at t.heir disposal.
D. OUTER SPACE. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in
orbit would be prohibited in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed on the production, stockpiJing, and testing of boosters for space
vehicles. States would support increased cooperation in peaceful
uses of outer space.
E. MILITARY BASES. Reduction of military bases, wherever they
might be located, would be initiated in Stage II, and final reductions
would be made in Stage III.
F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Military expenditures would be reported throughout the disarmament process.
2

Verification
The verification of disarmament would be the responsibility of an
International Disarmament Organization, which would be established
within the framework of the United Nations. Reductions of armaments and armed forces would be verified at agreed locations; and
limitations on production, testing, and other specified activities, at
declared locations. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exceeded and that activities subject to limitation or prohibition w'ere not being conducted clandestinely would
be provided through arrangements which would relate the extent
of inspection at any time to the amount of disarmament being
undertaken and to the risk to the disarming states of possible violations.
Such assurance might, for example, be accomplished through
arrangements under 'which states would divide themselves into a
number of zones through which inspection would be progressively
extended. By the end of Stage III, when disarmament had been
completed, all parts of the territory of states would have been inspected.

Reduction of the Risk of War
To promote confidence and reduce the risk of war during the
disarmament process, states would, beginning in Stage I, give advance
notification of major military movements and maneuvers, establish
observation posts to report on concentrations and movements of
military forces, and insure rapid and reliable communications among
heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War
would examine possible extensions and improvements of such measures
as well as additional measures to reduce the risk of war through
accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack.

Arrangements for Keeping the Peace
In Stage I, states would undertake obligations to refrain from the
threat or use of force of any type contrary to the United Nations
Charter. Throughout the three stages of disarmament, states would
use all available means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would
seek to improve processes for this purpose, and would support measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain
international peace and security.
A United Nations Peace Observation Corps would be established
in Stage I, and a United Nations Peace Force, in Stage II. The
United Nations Peace Force, which would be equipped with agreed
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types of armaments and would be supplied agreed manpower by
states, would be progressively strengthened until, in Stage III, it
would be fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed
world.
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Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World
COMPLETE TEXT
In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits
the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty.
A.

OBJECTIVES

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and
war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
(b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by
effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with
with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as
well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological,
and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production
of such weapons;
(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass
destruction;
(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to
organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training,
and closing of all military training institutions;
(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.
3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and
complete dis arm amen t, states would have at their disposal only those
non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are
agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the
personal security of citizens.
4. To ensure that durinz and after implementation of general and
complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed
manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with
638823 0 - 6 2 -- 2
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agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United
Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.
5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the
United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under
the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and
after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to
this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization
and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all
places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B.

PRINCIPLES

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives
are:
1. Disarnlament would be implemented until it is completed by
stages to be carried out within specified time limits.
2. Disarmanlent would be balanced so that at no stage of the
implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain
military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for
all.
3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively
verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure
throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments
and armed forces were not exceeded.
4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would
be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to
ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences
as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation
in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take
place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been
implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements
required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

Introduction
The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would
begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to
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the. Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied.
Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and
armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition
requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and
measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and
proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

Stage I
Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and
would be completed within three years from that date.
During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out

other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon
the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification
in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through t'he
measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS
1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by
thirty percent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph
b below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted
in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b would be reduced
by thirty percent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.
b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be
subject to reduction in Stage I (the followiJ;lg list of categories, and
of types within categories, is illustrative) :
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000
kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or
greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range
of 300 kilometers or greater.
(Within this category, the United States, for example, would
declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles
together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound
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Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman
missiles, which came within the category description, together with,
where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared
inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty
would be similarly detailed).
(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between
15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included
in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometers and 5,000
kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The
Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).
(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between
2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).
(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles)
and air-to-surface aerodynanlic and ballistic missiles and free rockets
having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together
with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare
their armaments by types within the category).
(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed
launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by
types within the category).
(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems,
together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would
declare their armaments by types within the category).
(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by
types within the category).
(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. (The
Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).
(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a
caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their
armaments by types within the category).
(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons
or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships,
cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare
their armaments by types within the category).
2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction
of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their
armaments existing at the agreed date.
b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each
consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during
Stage I would be carried out during each step.
c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments
to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under
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supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During
the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be
destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The
number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting
their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to
thb Treaty.
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a
Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify th~ foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.
3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I
and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed
retained armaments.
b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the
categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1
above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production
of armaments:
(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the end that the ten percent reduction in numbers in each
category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in
Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore
(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight
of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300
kilometers or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be <?ompensated for by the
destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end
that the ten percent reduction in destructive capability as well as
numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting
thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in
any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances
provided in subparagraph b above, that Party would be entitled to
retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its
production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so
retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in subparagraph b (1) and, where applicable, b (2) above to the end that
the ten percent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty
percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.
d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual
quotas.
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e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.
4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved
questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III
the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light
of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES
1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and
for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding
2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed
exceptions, reduce their force levels t.o 100,000 or one pereent of their
population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the
force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence
upon the entry into force of the Treaty.
2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel
maintained by national governments in the following categories:
a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel
serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.
b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active
duty as fixed by national law.
c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other
forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military
mISSIon.
3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following
manner:
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing
reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.
10

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps,
each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels
would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels
existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of
Stage I.
c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization
would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that
retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.
4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including proc~dures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment
by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives
of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable
materials for use in nuclear weapons.
b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:
(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International
Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and
production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of
producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.
(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use
in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to
the Treaty would submit to the International. Disarnlament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable
materials which were still being produced at each facility.
(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify t.h e foregoing measures at declared facilities and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.
2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear
Weapons

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use
in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than
use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235
11

from past production. The purposes for which such materials would
be used would be determined by the state to which the material
belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear
weapons.
b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear
weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in
stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for
purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such
safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.
3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for
purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject
to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used
in nuclear weapons.
b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be
developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation
of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree
that:
a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at
any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:
(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state
which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed
date;
(2) Not assist · any such state in manufacturing any nuclear
weapons.

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear
weapon before the agreed date would:
(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear

weapons;
(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear
weapons.
5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions
and providing for effective international control had come into force
prIor to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would
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become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty
would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.
b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the
entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions
would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international
control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages
II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons
stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty
would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. OUTER SPACE
1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons
capable of producing mass destruction.
I

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United
Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.
3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of
space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such
launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International
Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space
vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on
a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle
or missile to be launched.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization
would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles
and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for
detecting unreported launchings.
4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space
vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities
would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization
638823 0 - 6 2 - 3
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in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth In the
annex on verification.

E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International
Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a
report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include
an itemization of military expenditures.
2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related
In the light of
this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate
arrangements respecting military expenditures.
to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR
In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the'
Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:
1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Maneuvers

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of
major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the
Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific
arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of
movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be
transmitted, would be agreed.
2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to
be established at agreed locations, including major ports, ~ailway
centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on
concentrations and movernents of military forces. The number of
such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step
of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts,
including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving
and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts
would be agreed.
3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be
extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.
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4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of
military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve
communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.
5. Communications Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of
rapid and reliable communications amoI;lg their heads of government
and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Specific
arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the
Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary General.
6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the
International Disarmament Organization to examine and make
recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications,
or surprise attack. Specific. arrangements for such measures as might
be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be
subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT
ORGANIZATION
1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established
upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Treaty.
2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and
fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist
the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its
functions and in the e~ecution of the decisions made by it in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty.
3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures·in accordance with the following principles which
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would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the
annex on verification:
a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified
by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and
would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where
appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful
uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be
verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the
agreed depots or o.t her agreed locations.
b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other
specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament
Organization. Parties ·to the Treaty would declare the nature and
location of all production and testing facilities and other specified
activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have
access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.
c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces
were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the
Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided
by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed
arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the
extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the
amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to
the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. . This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features
as the following:
(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to
which this form of verification was applicable would be subj ect to
selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided
below.
(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an
agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step
of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament
Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces,
and specified types of activities subject to verification within each
zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would
not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.
(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively
inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during
Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be
inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their
selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory
was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection
of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and

16

other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against
undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone
or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection
would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as
agreed measures being verified were conc~rned, access within the zone
would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out
with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.
(4) Once a zone had been i~spected it would remain open for
further inspection while verification was being extended to additional
zones.
(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had
been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of
the territory of Parties to the Treaty.
4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

a. The International Disarmament Organization would have:
(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
(2) A Control Council consis.ting of representatives of all the

major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other
Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and
(3) An Administrator who would administer the International
Disarmament Organization under .t he direction of the Control Council
and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to
ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the
International Disarmament Organization.
b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have
power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study
groups,. as either of them might deem necessary.
5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among
others which might be agreed:
a. Electing non-permanent members to the ·Control Council;
b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;
c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the
Con trol Council;
,--,n
d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament
Organization and the United Nations and other international
organizations;
e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament
Organization;
f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and
deciding upon matters referred. to it by the Control Council;
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g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United
Nations;
h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;
i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by
the General Assembly of the United Nations;
j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by
the Parties to the Treaty;
k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty
or disarmament in general.
6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among
others which might be agreed:
a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;
b . Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;
c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and
operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;
d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to
the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;
e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of
disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation
and operation of the verification arrangements;
f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget.of the
International Disarmament Organization;
g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power
by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions
to the Treaty;
i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty
or to disarmament in general.
7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among
others which might be agreed:
a. Administering ·the installation and operation of the verification
arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;
b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by
the verification arrangements;
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c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament
Organization;
d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progresf? of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation
and operation of the verification arrangements.
8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty
would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and
its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International
Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory
of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex
to the Treaty.
9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established
within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its
activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements
with the United N a.tions, and the Administrator of the International
Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary General
of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.
b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other
reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.
c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would
consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.
NOTE: The above outline does not cover all the possible details
or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament
Organization and the United Nations.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE
1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain,
in their international relations, from the threat or use of for.ce of
any type-including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological
means of warfare-contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United N a tioDs Charter.
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2. Rules of I ntemational Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a
subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of
the codification and progressive development of rules of international
conduct related to disarmament.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression
and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a
would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion.
3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes
for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between
them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty,
including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the
United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled
by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization
would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on
another mode of settlement.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under
the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which
should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful
settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in
nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.
4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties t.o the Treaty would agree to surport measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations
so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and
security.
5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United
Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would
agree on the following measures within the United Nations:
a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to
a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the
peace;
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b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;
c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United
Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose,
mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control,
training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.
6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment
within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with
a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched promptly to
investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a
breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps
could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout
the world.

I. TRANSITION
1. Transition from Stage I to Stage I I would take place at the end of Stage 1,
upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried
out.
b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review
the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining
whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control
Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the
agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more
than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the
permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before
a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage I I would
take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing
circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage II
Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would
be completed within three years from that date.
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During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced
during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament
in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization
would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations
undertaken during Stage II; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace
through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and
through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS
1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced
their armaments in agreed categories by thirty percent would during
Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories
listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty percent of
the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.
b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to
the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed
in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II.
Such Parties to the Trea~y would during Stage II reduce the inventory
of each type of such armaments by sixty-five percent in order that
such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction
by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties
to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty percent
in Stage I.
2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International
Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories
existing at the beginning of Stage II pf the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in -subparagraph b below, and would
during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such arma.ments
by fifty percent.
b . All types of armaments within further agreed categories would
be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is
illustrative) :
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to
2,500 kilograms (declarati~ns by types).
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(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations
by types).
(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10
kilometers (declarations by types).
(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than
100 mm. (declarations by types).
(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers and transport
vehicles (declarations by types).
(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons
or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed
in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of
less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations
by types).
(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in
Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b and in subparagraph b above
would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments
agreed for the end of Stage II.
3. Method of Reduction

The foregoing measures wo uld be carried out and would be verified
by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.
4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within
agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained
armaments.
b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be
reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments
agreed for the end of Stage II.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing
of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of
missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the In terna tional Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. Additional Measures
a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means
of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production
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and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:
(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical

and biological weapons of mass destruction.
(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical
and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty percent
below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.
(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an
annex to the Treaty.
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification the In terna tional Disarmamen t Organization
would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance
that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not
exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing
limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES
1. Reduction of Armed Forces

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures
providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further
reduce their force levels on the following basis:
(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty percent
below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.
(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been
subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during
Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage,
below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would
not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of
Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which ha,.d not been subject to
measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage
I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with
those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force
levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed
levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.
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c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel In
the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage 1.
2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and
would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization
in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage 1.
3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be
placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training
for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of
accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to
reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and
fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:
a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International
Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types
and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types
of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials
to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for
which such materials would be used would be determined by the
state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials
were not used in nuclear weapons.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable
materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of
fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.
d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any
remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.
e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an
annex to the Treaty.
f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in
the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament
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Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the
foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.
2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons
remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties
to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the
last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining
nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials
for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would
be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in
accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex
on verification.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful
uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be
located.
2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subj ect to the foregoing
measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an -annex to the
Treaty_
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR
In the light of the examination by the International Commission
on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the
Treat.y would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared
desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The
Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving
the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements
or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after
Stage II.
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F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT
ORGANIZATION
The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the
measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3
of Stage I.

G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE
1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted
during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just
and ' peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or
political in nature.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without
reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that
Court to decide international legal disputes.
2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the
study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment
of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body
and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all
Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their
disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound
by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a
period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the
International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider
themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the
Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to
disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.
b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion
conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and
sUbversion.
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3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of
the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within
the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened
during Stage II.
4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty 'would conclude arrangements for the
expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation
Corps.
5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would,
in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing
appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

H. TRANSITION
1. Transition from Stage I I to Stage I I I would take place at the end of Stage
II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried
out;
b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become
Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage I I, the Control Council would review
the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at
the end of Stage I I whether they existed.
3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control
Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the
agreed period of Stage I I would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more
than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the
permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before
a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage I I I would take
place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing
circumstances did in fact exist.
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Stage III ·
Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would
be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.
During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;

2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament

in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization
would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification
subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace
during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS
1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed
types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal seturity of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would
eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of
Stage II.
2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex
to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization
would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that
retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed
agreed levels.
3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of
citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United
Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied
research, development, production, and testing of armaments and
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would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes.
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an
annex to the Treaty.
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and
would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing
measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES
1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at
their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements
necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect
the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of
providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the
Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force
levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded
organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national
military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian
personnel associated with the foregoing.
2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed
sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an
annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance
that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or
subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces
required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal
security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the
United Nations Peace Force.
3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and
would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military
establishments or military service. inconsistent with the foregoing
measures.
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C. NUCLEAR ·WEAPONS
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to
reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would
eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would
cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for
production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than
use in such weapons.
2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed
sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an
annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance
that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons
remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no
such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful
uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal,
wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for
such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to
the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and
protect the personal security of citizens.
2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing
measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be ·set forth in
an annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in
the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and
provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and
facilities.
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E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE
1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures
respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:
a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International
Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any
technological invention having potential military significance.
b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups
as might be required to examine the potential military significance of
such di~coveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert
study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish
agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International
Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions
were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would
become an annex to the Treaty.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and
inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization
in accordance w~th subparagraph a above.
2. International Cooperation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international
cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and
to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and
free interchange of views among s-cientific and technical personnel.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR
1. Improved Measur.es

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International
Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the
Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared
desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The
Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and
after Stage III.
2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required
to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens
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those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war
that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION
The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the
measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3
of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament
measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended
to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide
continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of
Stage III.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE
1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps
and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful
change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful
settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political
in nature.
2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to
disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other
agreed procedure.
3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United
Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient
armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III
1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage I I I, the Control Council
would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage I I I had been carried out.
2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control
Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out,
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the agreed period of Stage I I I would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more
than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more
of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such
undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed
before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine
whether Stage III had been completed.
3. After the completion of Stage I I I, the obligations undertaken in Stages I,
I I and I I I would continue.
;>0

General Provisions Applicable
to All Stages
1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for
considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were
believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the ligh t of experience
in the -early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures
would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty
aft.er a specified period of time.
2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as
were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty
to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into
force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange
of views and 'information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the
achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force of
the Treaty

s. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession, by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.
b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty
could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on
recommendation of the Control Council.
c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by
_____ states, including the United St.ates of America, the Union
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of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following
states:
d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundalnental purpose
of a permanent state of general and complete disarmarnent. in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming in to force of particular measures
or stages.
e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort
to induce other states or aut.horities to accede to the Treaty.
f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in
accordance with constitutional processes.
g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would
have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.
4. Finance

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International
Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear
the International Disarmament Organization's expenses as provided
in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance
with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.
b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on
behalf of the Internf\tional Disarmament Organization.
5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions
in English, French, .Russian, Chinese and Spanish.
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